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Abstract—Programmers often add meaningful information
about program semantics when naming program entities such
as variables, functions, and macros. However, static analysis
tools typically discount this information when they look for
bugs in a program. In this work, we describe the design
and implementation of a static analysis checker called SWAPD,
which uses the natural language information in programs to
warn about mistakenly-swapped arguments at call sites. SWAPD
combines two independent detection strategies to improve the
effectiveness of the overall checker. We present the results of a
comprehensive evaluation of SWAPD over a large corpus of C
and C++ programs totaling 417 million lines of code. In this
evaluation, SWAPD found 154 manually-vetted real-world cases
of mistakenly-swapped arguments, suggesting that such errors—
while not pervasive in released code—are a real problem and a
worthwhile target for static analysis.
Index Terms—static analysis, natural language, swapped argu-
ments, big code
I. INTRODUCTION
Static analysis tools consist of automated “checkers”, each
of which identifies potential problems by looking for matches
of a known code defect pattern or violations of an established
program development rule. However, traditional static analysis
techniques—such as those based on data-flow analysis—do not
use the rich natural language information in programs: variable
names, field names in a structure or a class, function names,
macro names, etc. Programmers seldom choose these names
at random; they select names that convey information about
the semantic concepts they are manipulating, with identifiable
patterns in the creation, composition, and usage of those
names. As we show in this work, static analysis tools can
and should use these patterns to detect more bugs.
In this paper we introduce SWAPD, an automated static
analysis checker that uses natural language information to
detect mistakenly swapped arguments at call sites. Listing 1
shows an example1 of such a mistaken swap, found with
SWAPD in the open-source code for the editor xvile [1]. Here,
the kill function from signal.h is called incorrectly: the
arguments for process identifier and signal have been swapped.
Because the two arguments are type compatible, even the
compiler is unlikely to complain about the swap.
Incorrect argument ordering is an easy mistake to make
when programming in a language that supports positional
∗Roger Scott performed this work while at GrammaTech.
1All the bugs listed in this paper were found with SWAPD on real-world
code not written by the authors. For the sake of presentation, the listings
simplify or elide the code context.
arguments2, especially if the declaration for the callee function
is not readily available. Programmer confusion may be exacer-
bated by certain function and interface design choices, such as
counter-intuitive argument ordering or long parameter lists. In
typed programming languages, type checking may catch some
swapped argument errors, but not all, as seen in Listing 1.
1 // declaration in signal.h
2 int kill(pid_t pid, int
:::
sig);
3
4 // use in xvile
5 if (child < 0 && errno == EINTR) {
6 kill(
::::::
SIGKILL, cpid);
Listing 1. Bug found with SWAPD: the arguments on line 5 are
mistakenly swapped.
Underpinning SWAPD are two observations about developer
behavior when naming program entities. First, programmers
often choose argument names that are similar to parameter
names, due to an underlying conceptual match between the
two [2]. Therefore, as in Listing 1, an accidental swap may
have taken place if both (a) argument names do not cover
(i.e., have a sufficient correspondence with) their parameter
names, and (b) they would cover if argument positions were
swapped. Second, if we examine several calls to a function
(e.g., calls to a library function in a large code corpus), we
find discernible statistical patterns with respect to argument
names and their positions in the calls. Statistically, if argument
names are atypical in their current positions, but common in
swapped positions, it may indicate an error.
1 // declaration in X11/Xlib.h
2 extern Bool XQueryExtension(Display, _Xconst char
*, int*, int* /* first_event_return */, int*
/* :::::::::::::::::first_error_return */);
3
4 // use in gpaste
5 if (XQueryExtension (display, "XInputExtension",
&xinput_opcode,
::::::::::::::::::
&xinput_error_base,
&xinput_event_base)) { /* ... */
Listing 2. Bug found by SWAPD when parameter names are not
available in the declaration.
We have found that these two detection strategies are most
effective when used in combination. In particular, we make use
of statistical data to reduce both false positives (§III-F) and
false negatives (§III-G). As a motivating example, consider the
GPaste [3] bug in Listing 2, also found with SWAPD. Here,
2That is, the position of the arguments in a function call denotes which
parameter they correspond to.
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no parameter names are available in the declaration, so the
second, statistical technique was key to detecting the bug.
A key feature of SWAPD is that we split parameter and
argument names into smaller units, called morphemes3, before
applying our techniques. Operating on morphemes rather than
whole names is one of the factors that distinguishes SWAPD
from closely related works [4], [5]. Splitting is motivated by
the intuition that program identifiers are often constructed by
agglutinating two or more morphemes. Listing 1 and List-
ing 2 represent individual examples of this naming behavior.
Indeed, Figure 5 (§IV-D) shows that a significant portion of
the corpus uses names containing multiple morphemes. For
example, in Listing 1, a naı¨ve attempt to match parameters
and arguments based on string edit distances could fail, but
splitting SIGKILL into sig and kill, and cpid into c and
pid makes the correspondence clear. Our morpheme-based
approach also allows us to improve signal by removing mor-
phemes that appear in multiple arguments in a call; those likely
represent conceptual information about the calling context
rather than about the intended correspondence to parameters.
For example, in Listing 2, splitting xinput_error_base
and xinput_event_base into constituent morphemes (and
eliminating the common morphemes xinput and base)
helps identify the underlying pattern—that error and event
are statistically more likely in their swapped positions. We
have found real bugs with multi-morpheme names (e.g., List-
ing 6), as summarized in Figure 6 (§IV-D).
The techniques used in SWAPD are largely programming
language agnostic. They are broadly applicable to programs
in languages that support positional arguments. We have
implemented a SWAPD prototype targeting C/C++ code; those
languages are heavily used in security and reliability-critical
software, which provides particular motivation for accurate
bug detection. During our empirical evaluation and triage of
SWAPD warnings, we found that many apparent argument
swaps are intentional. Thus, we have designed and adapted a
variety of techniques to reduce the number of false positives.
Our major contributions include:
• A cover-based checker for detecting swapped arguments
via mismatches between argument and parameter names.
• A statistical checker for swapped arguments based on data
collected from a large code corpus.
• A morpheme-oriented handling of names in both these
approaches, for increasing the relevant signal present in
names.
• A hybrid approach combining the two checkers and
further false positive reduction techniques to achieve high
accuracy in detecting swapped-argument errors.
• A comprehensive evaluation of SWAPD on 417 million
lines of open-source C/C++ code corpus [6]; we believe
our evaluation to be one of the largest in this research
area, especially for C/C++. SWAPD found 154 swapped
argument errors across this corpus. This figure suggests
that, while swapped-argument errors are not extremely
3From the linguistic term for a unit of meaning in a natural language.
common, they are a real problem, and efforts to detect
them are likely to provide value to developers.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: we
give an overview of SWAPD (§II); provide details of specific
algorithms and techniques (§III); present the results of our
empirical evaluation (§IV); discuss related work (§V); and
conclude (§VI).
II. OVERVIEW
In this section, we give an overview of SWAPD. We include
a number of forward references to §III that contain further
details on relevant algorithms, techniques, and heuristics.
Figure 1 is an overview of SWAPD, featuring the bug in
Listing 1. The top left quadrant shows the input to SWAPD:
the call site being checked, and the corresponding function
declaration. The function declaration is an optional input—if
it is not available, then the cover-based checker is skipped.
Given a call site, we extract names (§III-A): from the argu-
ment expressions at the call site and from the parameters in
the callee function declaration (if available). Next, we split
(§III-B) both argument and parameter names into morphemes.
Offline, we use a large corpus of code to compute a
statistical database (§III-D), shown in the bottom left quadrant
of Figure 1. The database is a key-value store, where keys are
triples consisting of a function name, argument position, and
morpheme. The values are weights indicating the number of
projects in the corpus where the morpheme appears in calls to
that function, at that argument position. Informally, the weight
reflects the number of human programmer communities who
considered that the morpheme is appropriate to use at the given
argument position for that function.
The right-hand portion of the diagram shows the SWAPD
pipeline of four stages. First, we compare the parameter mor-
phemes and argument morphemes in the cover-based checker
(§III-E). This stage does not need the statistical database, but
it does require the function declaration with parameter names.
If the cover-based checker finds a suspected error, SWAPD
uses the statistical database to perform further vetting (§III-F)
of the warning. The vetting rules out false positives due to
usage patterns for certain functions where seemingly-swapped
argument orderings are not rare, indicating that they could
have a genuine and intentional use case. If we did report
such warnings, there could be a lot of false positives due
to function-specific patterns adopted by developers. If the
suspected error passes the vetting step, we move on to the
false-positive filtering stage described further below.
1 // declaration in GStreamer
2 guint64 gst_util_uint64_scale (guint64 val,
guint64 num, guint64
:::::
denom);
3
4 // use in gst-plugins
5 diff = gst_util_uint64_scale_int (diff,
::::::::::
denom_rate, num_rate);
Listing 3. Example call where seemingly-swapped arguments are
statistically not rare—thus indicating a likely intentional swap.
Listing 3 shows a function declaration from GStreamer [7]
and a callsite with a likely intentional swap. It is statistically
argument names
parameter names
call site in user code
kill(SIGKILL, cpid);
/* nearby code + comments */
callee declaration
// signal.h
int kill(pid_t pid, int sig);
statistics curation
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DB
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kill(pid, SIGHUP);
.
.
.
kill(getpid(), SIGSTOP);
.
.
Fig. 1. High-level overview of SWAPD. The top left quadrant shows the input to the checker: a call site and its corresponding declaration. The bottom left
quadrant shows the offline curation—done once per corpus—of the statistical database, which is available to the checker. The argument names and parameter
names corresponding to a call site are split and then processed in four stages, shown in the right half of the diagram. The sequencing of the four stages is
shown using arrows marked with 3 (if there may be a warning to report) and 8 (if there is no warning to report). If a swapped-argument error at the call
site is still suspected after the false-positive filtering stage, a warning is reported as shown in the bottom right quadrant.
not rare to call gst_util_uint64_scale_int with the
morphemes denom and num in the second and third argument
positions respectively, i.e., in a swapped order based on
parameter names, possibly as a shortcut for computing the
reciprocal of the fraction. We discard such warnings.
If the cover-based checker and the statistical vetting do
not find any errors at a call site, or are not applicable (as
in Listing 2), SWAPD runs the statistical checker (§III-G)
to look for other evidence of potential errors using data
from the statistical database. Intuitively, we look for pairs of
morphemes that appear at two argument positions at the call
site, with the property that, statistically, each morpheme is
significantly more common at the other’s position than at its
own. Hypothetically, suppose the cover-based checker was not
able to identify the error shown in Figure 1. The statistical
checker gives SWAPD another chance to catch the error: the
statistical database suggests that the pid morpheme is often
used in the first position at a kill call site, and the sig
morpheme is often used in the second position. This statistical
data suggests that the morphemes at this call site may have
been swapped. Note that both the cover-based checker and
the statistical checker could have identified the same error:
we quantify how often such an overlap occurs in (Figure 4,
§IV-C).
The final stage for all candidate warnings is false-positive
filtering (§III-H): it applies various heuristics to distinguish
between intentional and mistaken swaps. For example, con-
sider Listing 4, which presents a false-positive finding in
GrafX2 [8], filtered out by SWAPD. The second call to
iconv_open at line 6 uses argument names that appear to be
swapped; however, there is a call to the same function with
the arguments in the canonical order on the preceding line.
If the programmer calls the function “both ways”, with calls
in close proximity to each other, it is likely that both usages
are deliberate (because it undermines the theory that the swap
was due to not knowing the correct order). We use several
false-positive filtering heuristics, including one motivated by
the call pattern in Listing 4.
1 // declaration in iconv.h
2 iconv_t iconv_open(const char *tocode, const char
*::::::::fromcode);
3
4 // use in grafx2
5 cd = iconv_open(TOCODE, FROMCODE); // From UTF8
to ANSI
6 cd_inv = iconv_open(
::::::::
FROMCODE, TOCODE); // From
ANSI to UTF8
Listing 4. The candidate warning on line 6 is ruled out in the false-
positive filtering stage because of the nearby correct call on line 5.
Throughout our pipeline, we use techniques to minimize
noise and maximize signal in the natural language information.
One such technique is comparing morphemes to each other
using a similarity metric that takes into account abbreviations
(§III-C): for example, msg is a common abbreviation for
message. Another technique is to remove morphemes that
are common to pairs of argument names being checked, such
as remote in Listing 5. Removal of the common morpheme
allows SWAPD to detect this bug in BoNeSi [9].
1 // declaration in libnet
2 libnet_ptag_t libnet_build_tcp(uint16_t sp,
uint16_t dp, uint32_t seq, uint32_t
::
ack, /*
9 more parameters ... */);
34 // use in bonesi
5 if(libnet_build_tcp(origSrcPort, dstPort,
:::::::::
remoteAck, remoteSeq, /* 9 more arguments
... */)==-1) { /% ... %/
Listing 5. Removing the common morpheme remote from the
argument names at line 5 clarifies their relationships with the
parameter names: the third and fourth arguments appear to be swapped.
In summary, SWAPD uses a hybrid approach based on both
non-statistical and statistical techniques to detect and confirm
swapped-argument errors.
III. DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION
This section provides details about specific stages, algo-
rithms, and heuristics of SWAPD.
A. Extracting name information
SWAPD begins by extracting names from argument ex-
pressions at call sites. If the corresponding declarations are
available and include parameter names, those names are also
extracted. We modeled our name extraction on DeepBugs [5],
with adaptations to C and C++. For an abstract syntax tree
node n, we extract a string name(n), where possible, as
follows.
• If n is an identifier, return its name.
• If n is a non-string literal, return a string representation
of its value.
• If n is this, return “this”.
• If n is (m), return name(m).
• If n is one of ++m, --m, m++, or m--, return
name(m).
• If n is ⊗m, where ⊗ ∈ {&, +, -, * }, return name(m).
• If n is sizeof(m), return “sizeof”.
• If n is a cast or explicit type conversion, return the name
of the operand.
• If n is l.m, l->m, or l::m, return name(m).
• If n is l[m], return name(l).
• If n is a call l.m(. . .) or m(. . .), return name(m).
• If n is a macro identifier, return the macro name.
• In all other cases, return nothing.
To handle C/C++ macros, we use information from the
preprocessor input rather than the parser input (which is the
preprocessor output), which often allows us to operate on more
meaningful symbolic names. If an entire function call is a
result of a macro expansion, or if it is a virtual function call,
we skip collecting names from that call site.
B. Splitting names into morphemes
We split argument names for the input call site to be
checked, and parameter names for function declarations.
We also split argument names when building the statistical
database (III-D). Our prototype uses the Ronin [10] identifier-
splitting algorithm. Ronin is an extension of the Samurai [11]
algorithm, and uses a global table of token frequencies. Ad-
ditionally, during splitting, we drop very common morphemes
like “get”, “set”, “i”, “j”, etc.
C. Morpheme similarity metric
Computing the similarity between two morphemes is a
fundamental operation in SWAPD. We define a similarity
metric ∼ to quantify the degree of correspondence between
two morphemes while allowing for abbreviations. If two
morphemes do not have the same first character, their ∼ value
is zero. Otherwise, their ∼ value is computed by applying
a penalty for each character that must be deleted from a
morpheme in order for the resulting strings to contain the same
characters in the same order. The penalty is lower for vowels
than for consonants, decreases toward the end of the string, and
is zero for a final “s” (to account for singular/plural forms).
Our penalty for missing characters is normalized by the length
of the morphemes, so in longer morphemes we allow for more
missing characters while still maintaining a high similarity. We
say two morphemes are sufficiently similar for a particular
purpose if the value of ∼ is greater than a context-specific
threshold. Note that ∼ can be naturally extended to be aware
of synonyms; the end of §IV-D presents a brief discussion of
such an experimental extension.
D. Computing a statistical database
The statistical database is keyed by triples consisting of a
function name f , an argument position i, and a morpheme
m. For each such triple, it contains a weight w(f,m, i). The
weight captures the number of projects in the corpus where
morpheme m appears at position i in a call site for f .
For a given function f , morpheme m, and argument po-
sitions i and j, we can use the weights in the database to
compute a numerical relative frequency score:
ψ(f,m, i, j) =
w(f,m, i)
w(f,m, j)
This score attempts to quantify how much more common
the morpheme m is at argument position i than at argument
position j at call sites to f . In the remainder of the paper,
we will sometimes use the notation ψ(m, i, j), omitting the
function f when it is clear from context. When we build
the database, we use the splitting techniques described in
III-B, and we eliminate common morphemes that appear in
all argument positions at a call site.
E. Cover-based checker
The cover-based checker detects swapped-argument errors
if the morphemes in the argument names better “cover” the
morphemes in the parameter names when argument positions
are swapped at a call site. This checker is skipped if a function
declaration lacks parameter names.
After splitting the parameter and argument names into
morphemes, we proceed pairwise, for each pair of argument
positions i and j. In the rest of this paper, Ai and Aj denote
the sets of argument morphemes at positions i and j respec-
tively; Pi and Pj denote the sets of parameter morphemes at
corresponding positions.
First, we eliminate any morphemes common to Ai and Aj ,
and similarly for Pi and Pj , to handle cases like Listing 5.
If this elimination leaves any of Ai, Aj , Pi, or Pj empty, the
cover checker does not proceed any further.
Next, we compute the quality of the match, or “cover”, from
a set of argument morphemes to a set of parameter morphemes.
We run this computation for the original order, computing how
well Ai covers Pi and Aj covers Pj , and for the “swapped”
order, i.e., how well Ai covers Pj and Aj covers Pi.
Informally, a set of argument morphemes cover a set of
parameter morphemes if every parameter morpheme is suffi-
ciently similar to (using the metric ∼ described in III-C) at
least one argument morpheme. This relation is asymmetric: it
is possible to have argument morphemes that are not similar
to any parameter morpheme, yet still have coverage. However,
if a parameter morpheme is not similar to any argument
morpheme, then there is no coverage.
We formalize a notion of coverage C (A,P ) for an argument
morpheme set A and a parameter morpheme set P :
C (A,P ) = min
p∈P
max
a∈A
(a ∼ p)
Our criterion for reporting a swapped-argument warning is
based on two thresholds, α1 and α2, empirically determined4
to be 0.5 and 0.75 respectively. We produce a candidate
warning if and only if both of the following hold:
(C(Ai, Pi) < α1) ∧ (C(Aj , Pj) < α1)
(C(Ai, Pj) > α2) ∧ (C(Aj , Pi) > α2)
Informally, we require both sufficiently bad coverage in
the current positions and sufficiently good coverage in the
swapped positions.
1 // declaration in a different file
2 void removeHighCoverageNodes(Graph* graph, double
maxCov, boolean _export, Coordinate
:::::::::
minLength, /* more params */);
3
4 // use in https://github.com/dzerbino/velvet
5 removeHighCoverageNodes(graph, maxCoverageCutoff,
(Coordinate)
:::::::::::::::::::
minContigKmerLength,
flagExportFilteredNodes, /* more args */ );
Listing 6. Example bug to showcase the machinery of the cover-
based checker.
Listing 6 shows an example of a bug found using the cover-
based checker. Figure 2 depicts the strong coverage mapping
when arguments at position 3 and 4 are swapped.
F. Statistical vetting
We perform statistical vetting when the cover-based checker
flags a pair of arguments in positions i and j at a call site
as potentially swapped. We compute maxm∈Ai ψ(m, i, j) and
maxm∈Aj ψ(m, j, i). If either of these quantities exceeds a
vetting threshold β (empirically determined4 to be 1), we
conclude that the usage in question is statistically not rare
and so do not report a warning. Listing 3 shows such a case.
4We evaluated the results for a variety of settings and choose the best
precision/yield trade-off in our judgment. The space constraints prevent us
from providing further details of this process for each threshold.
min contig kmer length
min length
A3
P4
export
A4
P3
flag export filtered nodes
Fig. 2. Depicts the coverage in a swapped position, for the example Listing 6.
Here, C (A3, P4) = 1,C (A4, P3) = 1,C (A3, P3) = 0,C (A4, P4) = 0.
G. Statistical checks
When the cover-based checker does not find a warning at a
call site, we run the statistical checker. It uses the statistical
database (III-D) and the argument names at the call site. The
statistical checker can run even when the callee declaration
does not include parameter names or cannot be retrieved.
If the statistical database does not include statistics for
the function called at a call site, the statistical checker is
skipped. Otherwise, it considers every possible pair of ar-
gument positions i and j, and detects instances where two
morphemes are likely swapped across those positions using
the following approach. As before, we eliminate common
morphemes between Ai and Aj . After such elimination, if
either Ai or Aj are empty, we skip the rest of the steps below
for i and j.
We now look for pairs of argument morphemes ai ∈ Ai
and aj ∈ Aj such that min(ψ(ai, j, i), ψ(aj , i, j)) > γ, for a
threshold γ (empirically selected4 to be 5). Informally, we look
at how much more common each morpheme is in the other’s
position than in its own, and require the lesser of those two
“misplacement” scores to be greater than γ.
We also require that Ai \ ai = Aj \ aj , i.e., exactly one
morpheme is swapped from the two morpheme sets Ai and
Aj . If we find such a pair of morphemes ai and aj , we
perform one more check. We find the morpheme m with the
biggest statistical difference in frequency between position j
and position i, i.e, m = argmaxx[w(f, x, j)−w(f, x, i)]. We
verify that ai is sufficiently similar to m. The intuition is that
if morpheme ai is common in both positions i and j, then the
likelihood of a swap is lower; we are looking for evidence that
moving ai from i to j would bring the situation closer to what
is statistically most common. We perform a symmetric check
for aj . If both checks pass, we produce a candidate swapped-
argument warning involving argument positions i and j and
proceed with further false-positive reduction. Note that the
requirements and checks in this paragraph could be relaxed
to potentially catch more bugs, however, at the expense of
increased false positive rates.
H. False-positive filtering
Weeding out intentionally- vs. mistakenly-swapped argu-
ments can be difficult. We have developed a collection of
heuristics to identify likely intentional swaps. Some of them
come from the literature; we developed others empirically
by manually examining SWAPD warnings, identifying false
positives, and formalizing common features of those false
positives. Without false-positive filtering of this nature, the
developer experience of using such checkers can be frustrating.
We list our major heuristics below.
White-list words. Some words hint that a swap might be
intentional, e.g., “swap”, “exchange”, “rotate”, or “flip”. We
expand on the “nested in reverse” heuristic [4], and look for
such words in the following locations: the name of the callee
function, the name of the caller function, nearby conditional
expressions (i.e., the last five branches along the current
execution path, see Listing 7 from Mate Panel Libs [12]), the
six immediately-preceding lines of source code (including any
comment contents). We consider presence of such words to be
indicative of false positives, and filter out such warnings.
1 // decl in gdk-pixbuf.h
2 GdkPixbuf* gdk_pixbuf_new (/* 3 params */, int
width, int
:::::
height);
3
4 // use in mate-panel-libs
5 if (background->rotate_image /* && ..*/
6 // .. several lines of code, and nested if
7 r = gdk_pixbuf_new (/* 3 args */, :::::height, width);
Listing 7. False-positive warning filtered out, because “rotate” is in a
nearby conditional expression.
Swap distance. We found that on real-world code, all
warnings for argument positions i and j with |i− j| > 2 were
false positives. Therefore, we do not report such warnings.
Geometric code patterns. In geometric code, it is common
to combine swapping of axes with negation of one of two
values to achieve various transformations. We exclude as
intentional any apparent swapped-argument calls that negate
exactly one of the two arguments involved.
Type checking. We eliminate some false positives through
simple type checking on the types of the two arguments
involved (similar to [2], [13]). The intuition is that a swap of
arguments with incompatible types would have been detected
in development via a compiler error. Even among compatible
types, if the swapped order requires more type coercion, that
may argue for the correctness of the existing code.
Nearby declaration. If the declaration of the callee function
is in the same source file as the call site, we consider
the warning a false positive. This heuristic is based on our
empirical findings, and on the intuition that erroneous swaps
happen when the programmer forgets the correct argument
order. If the declaration is nearby, the programmer likely is
aware of the correct argument order.
Nearby correct call. If there are other calls to the same
function, but with unswapped arguments, within the same
caller function (see Listing 4), we consider the warning a
false positive. This heuristic (similar to the “duplicate method
calls” heuristic [4]) is based on empirical findings, and on
an intuition about reminder proximity similar to that of the
previous heuristic.
Swap is not rare. If the suspected swap is not an isolated
event, but occurs in three or more separate callsites within
the same calling function, we consider it a false positive. Our
observation is that anomalies tend to be intentional unless they
occur very rarely. This heuristic causes us not to report cases
where a function is called at several callsites consistently with
the wrong argument order; however, true positives of this kind
are far outweighed by false positives.
IV. EVALUATION
In this section, we present the results of an empirical
evaluation of SWAPD on a large C and C++ code corpus.
The major research questions we consider are:
R1. How well does SWAPD find warnings in real-world open-
source code?
R2. What is the value-add of the different stages in SWAPD?
R3. (a) How often are argument and parameter names con-
structed from multiple morphemes? (b) How many of
the true positives found involve multiple morphemes?
These questions are aimed at seeking justification for
morpheme-level reasoning, instead of operating directly
on whole names.
R4. (a) What effect does the corpus size used for the statistical
database have on SWAPD’s findings? (b) What is the
effect of leaving out those projects from the statistical
database, on which SWAPD produces any warnings?
We also provide a discussion of the warnings triaged (§IV-F)
and threats to validity (§IV-G) of our work.
A. Prototype implementation and corpus
We use the commercial static analysis tool CodeSonar [14]
to extract name information from call sites and their cor-
responding declarations, when available. We implemented
the statistics database computation (§III-D) and the SWAPD
checker prototype in Python. Our prototype generates warn-
ings in the SARIF format [15]. Such warnings can be imported
into an IDE or other SARIF viewers (such as CodeSonar)
for manual inspection and triage. CodeSonar remembers the
triage result (i.e., true/false positive), as well as other user
annotations, by fingerprinting the warning location. We found
this ability to be helpful for manual construction of ground
truth for the evaluation, and during review of the results.
We computed the statistical database using the open-source
Fedora 29 source-package repository [6], filtered to include
only projects containing C or C++ code. We performed addi-
tional filtering to reduce duplication and eliminated extremely
large projects. We successfully processed 6541 projects, con-
sisting of about 417 million lines of code. We refer to this set
of projects as the SRPM corpus in the rest of this paper. The
resulting statistical database contains morpheme information
for over four thousand functions.
B. Evaluation methodology
We considered evaluating SWAPD on both real-world code
and on a synthetically-generated dataset with randomly in-
jected swapped arguments. We decided against the latter,
because it is unclear how to generate a synthetic dataset
with a realistic distribution of both erroneous and intentional
swaps. In practice, intentional swaps far outnumber actual
swap errors, so we do not believe that a naı¨ve injection
approach that disregards them would lead to a realistic dataset;
thus, evaluation results on synthetic datasets may not carry
over to real-world code. Therefore, we decided to conduct
an evaluation exclusively on real-world open-source code.
We perform our evaluation on the SRPM corpus, i.e., 417
million lines of C and C++ code. As far as we are aware,
our evaluation is the largest (in terms of number of lines of
code) for a swapped-argument checker on any programming
language [4], [5]; and the largest by far [13] on C/C++.
A limitation of using real-world code for evaluation is the
lack of pre-existing ground truth. To obtain a list of true-
and false-positive warnings, we ran SWAPD under different
configurations (described in IV-C) to obtain a total of 4141
unique warnings reported on the SRPM corpus. Of these,
we sampled and manually triaged 859 unique warnings: we
marked 183 of these as true positives, and 676 as false
positives. When SWAPD is run again on the SRPM corpus
under any configuration, a warning reported at a triaged
location is recognized and automatically classified as a true
or a false positive. The manual triage task was shared by
six experienced developers, some of whom were involved
in the development of SWAPD. We applied a conservative
triage strategy—marking warnings as true positives if they
reflect issues worth raising in a code review (i.e., real bugs
or problems worth fixing even if there is no runtime error).
Otherwise, we marked warnings as false positives. Listing 8
from OpenVAS libraries [16] shows an example warning
marked as a false positive: we suspect that the swap on line
6 is intentional, because on line 5, the format string “src
host %s” uses an argument computed from dst.
1 // declaration
2 int init_v6_capture_device (struct in6_addr src,
struct in6_addr
:::
dst, char *filter);
3
4 // use in openvas-libraries
5 snprintf (filter, sizeof(filter), "ip6 and src
host %s", inet_ntop(AF_INET6, dst, addr,
sizeof (addr)));
6 bpf = init_v6_capture_device (*:::dst, src, filter);
Listing 8. Warning triaged as a false positive.
Because we manually triaged a sample of warnings, we
use precision and yield as our evaluation metrics. Precision is
the ratio of the number of true-positive warnings to the total
number of warnings. Yield is the total number of reported
true-positive warnings from our ground-truth dataset. Yield is
a proxy for recall: since there is no practical way to determine
the full set of all swapped-argument errors in the corpus, we
cannot determine what percentage of them we have found.
Making SWAPD practically useful requires balancing pre-
cision and yield. High precision with low yield leads to few
reported warnings; while these warnings are likely to be real
problems, many other real problems may be missed. Low
precision with high yield is also not ideal, because it leads
to large numbers of false positives. The developer effort to
sift through those can cause frustration and reduce adoption.
In a practical tool, scoring and sorting can be used to balance
these conflicting concerns. By assigning scores to warnings
based on their likelihood of being true positives, we can show
them to the user in a descending order. The user can then
decide when the effort of further manual triaging is no longer
justified by the likely benefit of discovering an additional true
positive. Scoring the warnings from SWAPD is an interesting
problem that is outside the scope of this paper.
C. Evaluating various stages
As outlined in Section II, SWAPD involves a multi-stage
pipeline, with four stages: (1) cover-based checker, (2) sta-
tistical vetting, (3) statistical checker, and (4) false-positive
filtering. Each of these stages impact precision and/or yield.
To expose the impact of each stage, we evaluated the precision
and yield of SWAPD in a variety of different configurations.
In each configuration name, the numbers indicate which of the
four stages are enabled. For example, in C3, only stage 3 is
enabled, and the rest of the stages are disabled.
Figure 3 shows the precision and yield of SWAPD for
various configurations. A few observations are clear: C1234
shows the best trade-off between precision and yield. C123
has higher yield, but very low precision—it reports an order-
of-magnitude more warnings in total than C1234. However,
75% of the warnings from C123 are false positives, which
justifies our adoption of the false-positive filtering stage to
increase precision. In fact, all the configurations without stage
4 enabled (i.e., C1, C12, C3, C123) have low precision.
Configurations other than C1234 and C123 have much lower
yield, suggesting that relying solely on either the cover-based
checker or the statistical checker misses several true-positive
warnings, justifying our hybrid approach. Comparing C12 vs.
C1, and C14 vs. C124, we see a small increase in precision
traded for a small decrease in yield: thus, cross-checking with
the statistical database to perform statistical vetting of the
cover-based checker warnings can be useful if a user prefers
precision over yield.
In summary, these results answer R1: with all the four
stages enabled, SWAPD finds 154 true-positive warnings5 on
the SRPM corpus, with a precision of 67%. These results
also answer R2: each of the four stages contribute to either
increasing precision or increasing yield, justifying the use
of each stage. Figure 4 shows the overlap in true-positive
warnings between the cover-based checker and the statistical
checker—both these approaches largely find different sets of
true warnings, further bolstering the case to use both of them.
D. The case for morpheme-level reasoning
As described in §I, operating on morphemes instead of
whole names is a key feature of our approach. Finding bugs
such as those in Listing 5 and Listing 6 highly benefit from
morpheme-level reasoning: using a string-distance metric on
whole names is not a good fit for finding such errors. However,
5C1234 reports 402 warnings in total on the SRPM corpus. Of these, 231
warnings are present in our manually-triaged ground-truth dataset. Among
these 231 warnings, 154 are true positives.
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Fig. 3. Precision vs. yield for various SWAPD configurations. C1234 has the
best trade-off between precision and yield.
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Fig. 4. Presents the number of unique true-positive warnings reported by
cover-based checker (C1) only, statistical checker (C3) only, and by both.
if almost all the argument and parameter names provided by
developers consist of single morphemes, then the morpheme-
level reasoning boils down to whole-name-level reasoning,
making morpheme-level reasoning overkill.
Figure 5 answers R3(a); it shows how often argument names
and parameter names in the SRPM corpus are constructed with
different morpheme-set sizes. If we cannot extract a name
from a call site or a declaration, it does not get counted
in this Figure. While a majority of both the argument and
parameter names chosen by developers are made up of single
morphemes, nearly 40% argument names are constructed from
more than one morpheme, lending credibility to our use of
morpheme-level reasoning.
Furthermore, in Figure 6, we plot the frequency distribution
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Fig. 5. Frequency distribution of morpheme-set sizes for argument names
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Fig. 6. Maximum number of morphemes (argument or parameter morphemes
in either positions) involved in a reported true positive by C1234.
of the maximum morphemes involved for all the true-positive
warnings reported by C1234: it serves to answer R3(b). For a
reported warning, let i and j be the two argument positions
involved in the swap, and let Ai, Aj , Pi, and Pj be the
argument morpheme and parameter morpheme sets in those
two positions respectively. Then, the maximum morphemes
involved in the warning is given by max{|Ai|, |Aj |, |Pi|, |Pj |}.
Nearly 42% of true-positive warnings involve names with
more than one morpheme, confirming that our morpheme-level
reasoning in the different stages are likely useful in identifying
real bugs.
1 size_t scm_port_buffer_put (SCM buf, const
scm_t_uint8 *src, size_t count, size_t end,
size_t
:::::
avail); // decl
2
3 // use in guile
4 scm_port_buffer_put (new_buf,
scm_port_buffer_take_pointer (pt->read_buf,
cur),
:::::
avail, 0, c_size);
Listing 9. Example bug identified when SWAPD considers
size and count to be synonyms.
Inclusion of synonym relationships in the similarity metric
∼ would allow morpheme-level reasoning to find even more
errors. For example, if we consider size and count as
synonyms, i.e., ∼ (size, count) = 1, then SWAPD finds the
error shown in Listing 9 from Guile [17]. As future work, we
want to automatically extract synonyms from code corpora,
and extend our morpheme-similarity metric with knowledge
of these synonyms.
E. Effect of corpus used for computing the statistical database
In Figure 7, we take different randomly-chosen subsets (1%,
5%, 25%) of the SRPM corpus to compute the statistical
database, and present the results of running C1234 on the
SRPM corpus with these different statistical databases. Each
random subset is computed five times. This plot serves to an-
swer R4(a), showing the effect of the corpus size used for the
statistical database on SWAPD’s findings. All the five random
trials with 1% of the corpus, and most of the five random
trials with 5% of the corpus, are in the bottom-left quadrant
(low precision and low yield). However, all the rest of random
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Fig. 7. Precision and yield reported when C1234 is run on the SRPM corpus
with the statistical database computed from a random subset (i.e., 1%, 5%,
25%, and 100%) of the projects in the SRPM corpus. Each random selection
is made five times: due to overlapping points, fewer than five points per subset
size may be visible. The legend “excl” refers to using a statistical database
that was computed without those 239 projects that had at least one warning
reported by C1234. Note that the origin in this chart is not at zero precision
and zero yield.
subsets are in the top-right quadrant (high precision and high
yield), suggesting that statistical database computation from
relatively small subsets of the SRPM corpus (i.e., sometimes
even just 5%) can provide most of the precision and yield
gains, compared to using the entire corpus. Note that the cover-
based checker has only a weak, second-order dependency on
the statistical database. If no statistics are available to vet
its results, the yield can only increase, with a decrease in
precision.
Furthermore, when computing the statistical database, if
we exclude all the 239 projects in the SRPM corpus that
C1234 reports a warning on, the precision and recall are not
affected much (see legend “excl”, both precision and recall are
only slightly lower than when using the entire corpus). This
observation answers R4(b) and confirms that the analysis is
not over-fit to the specific projects within which it is reporting
warnings.
F. Discussion of triaged warnings
Figure 8 compares the relative probabilities of a true-
positive warning occurring at a call site with a given number
of arguments. To compute these probabilities, we leave out
call sites with less than two arguments, because it would not
affect the relative probabilities shown here. We computed these
probabilities as described for Figure 11 in [4]. In contrast to the
probability distribution for Java programs [4], we found that
probability of true-positive warnings given a call site with two
or three arguments is comparable to the probabilities of those
with higher number of arguments. One possible explanation
for the differences in the probability distributions could be that
because C and C++ programs are “weakly typed”, it allows
more room for confusion in ordering arguments, even when
involving call sites with few arguments.
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arguments (for n = 2, . . . ,≥ 8). We computed these probability values in a
manner similar to Figure 11 in [4].
In our triage of SWAPD warnings, we found a variety of
reasons for false-positive warnings. Some example reasons
include: incorrect splitting of names into morphemes, incor-
rectly detected abbreviations, function-specific patterns that
statistical vetting is not able to pick up on, poor naming
decisions by the developer, patterns that are rare but not
incorrect, and names that don’t carry much meaning (see
Listing 10 from XScreenSaver [18]).
1 // decl in OpenGL
2 void glVertex3f(GLfloat x, GLfloat y, GLfloat
:
z);
3
4 // use in xscreensaver
5 glVertex3f (x,
:
z, y);
Listing 10. Likely false-positive warning: co-ordinate system could be
altered in OpenGL.
G. Threats to validity
Our techniques assume English names; it is unclear how
much of our work is applicable to non-English names.
Our statistical database is derived from a mature open-
source code corpus for the Linux platform, and this particular
corpus may have good coding patterns, which is likely ben-
eficial. However, we may have higher yield on projects that
are less mature or yet-to-be released. Similar to a lot of work
in this research area—where patterns are mined from code—
our statistical vetting and the statistical checker makes the
assumption that “most code is correct”. However, in specific
domains, this assumption may not hold [19]. We give more
importance to statistical patterns that occur across several
projects, which may help assuage some concerns about our
assumption. A possible area for improvement would be to
recognize similar code in different projects and discount the
statistics for occurrences across multiple similar projects. We
do this deduplication (§IV-A) at the granularity of entire files,
which ignores many other forms of code duplication.
We expect our work to be applicable for several popular pro-
gramming languages that support position-based arguments,
other than C and C++; however, techniques in SWAPD may
not be useful for programs written in languages with keyword
arguments, such as Smalltalk and Objective-C.
Finally, many of the warnings were triaged by people who
developed SWAPD, which could have caused some bias in
labeling warnings. One possible source of such bias is in the
sampling of the warnings to triage. If the validity of a warning
is difficult to ascertain, the triager may skip it and look for
an easier one. However, difficult-to-triage warnings are more
likely to be false positives, so skipping these would bias the
triaged results toward more true positives.
V. RELATED WORK
In this section we discuss closely related previous work.
A. Matching argument and parameter names
The idea of detecting swapped-argument errors using mis-
matches between argument names and parameter names has
been studied before [2], [4], [13]. Of these works, Rice et
al. [4] have the most extensive real-world evaluation (run on
200 million lines of proprietary code, and 10 million lines of
open-source code).
They detect incorrectly-ordered arguments at call sites in
Java programs, and their work is most similar to our cover-
based checker. They use string-similarity metrics on whole
names to detect mismatched correspondences between argu-
ments and parameters, whereas our cover-based checker per-
forms morpheme-level reasoning. We believe that the cover-
based checker is a better approach because it picks rele-
vant signals from names being compared. Comparing whole
names using a string distance is akin to comparing two
whole sentences using a string distance: there is fundamental
impedance mismatch; whereas using a cover-based checker
is akin to comparing two sentences based on the words
contained in them. Our approach is also readily extended
to other morpheme-similarity measures, including considering
synonymous morphemes to be equivalent. Their work will
miss reporting bugs if parameter names are not available or
not useful, whereas our hybrid approach can still report bugs
in such cases based on mined statistical patterns. Their work
will report false positives if there are function-specific anti-
patterns that developers use (such as Listing 3), whereas we
can filter out such warnings using statistical vetting.
B. Learning from code
With the increased availability of large amounts of code,
learning models of “correct” code from existing programs
and detecting anomalies as bugs [20] has been gaining pop-
ularity [21]–[25]; none of these [20]–[25] are mining name
information for detecting swapped-arguments errors. We dis-
cuss our work in contrast to two such closely related works:
DeepBugs [5] and APISan [26].
DeepBugs detects swapped-argument errors using a ma-
chine learning approach: they seed a corpus of programs with
artificial likely swapped-arguments errors, and train a classifier
to distinguish the artificial code from the unmodified real code.
Because the real code is expected to have very few swapped-
arguments errors, their hypothesis is that the classifier learns
to identify swapped-arguments errors in real code. They apply
their technique to JavaScript programs, with a corpus of 68
million lines of code. Their work is most similar to our
statistical checker.
Their artificial seeding of swapped arguments in a corpus
does not distinguish between intentional and unintentional
swaps, and therefore, their classifier is unlikely to learn such a
distinction. Determining whether a swap is intentional or not
requires considering the surrounding code and context (e.g.,
preceding source text, conditionals, caller function), but such
information is not taken into account by DeepBugs.
DeepBugs only considers swaps between the first two argu-
ments at a call site, whereas we consider swaps between all
pairs of arguments. DeepBugs requires a lot of training data;
and it only reports warnings when the whole function name
and the whole argument names (at first two positions) at a
call site are all present in the top 10,000 vocabulary of names.
DeepBugs reasons at the whole-name level, so call sites with
less-frequently occurring whole argument names (that could be
made of frequently-occurring morphemes) and function names
are not even considered. Our morpheme-level reasoning boosts
the signal present in name data for the statistical checker,
and our hybrid approach can find bugs even when there is
no statistical data available for a particular function.
Being able to explain why a warning is reported is an
essential element for adoption. Explaining why DeepBugs
predicted a call site to be buggy is hard [27], [28]. In
contrast, our approach provides straightforward algorithmic
explanations for each finding.
APISan detects various classes of errors by computing a
statistical database of function-usage characteristics, and then
finding anomalous patterns in the database. The characteristics
they extract from arguments at a call site do not pertain to
argument “names”. Instead, they focus on extracting and statis-
tically reasoning about traditional semantic relations between
argument values.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have presented SWAPD, a technique
to find mistakenly-swapped arguments at call sites. SWAPD
exploits “big code” and carefully combines four stages (cover-
based checker, statistical vetting, statistical checker, and false-
positive filtering) to balance the precision and yield of the
findings.
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